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Forgotten Experiment:
Canada’s Resettlement of Palestinian 
Refugees, 1955-1956
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In the summer of 1955, the Canadian government took the “bold step” of 
admitting displaced Palestinian refugees from the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. The 
government approved the resettlement of 100 skilled workers and their families. 
Canadian officials believed that alleviating the refugee problem in the Middle 
East would help in furthering regional stability. The resettlement scheme remained 
a politically sensitive issue as Arab governments protested against what they 
perceived as a Zionist plot to remove Palestinians from their ancestral land. For 
Canada, the admission of Palestinian refugees in 1956 served as an important 
“experiment” for the future selection and resettlement of non-European refugees.
À l’été 1955, le gouvernement canadien a fait preuve d’audace : il a admis des 
réfugiés palestiniens déplacés à cause de la guerre arabo-israélienne de 1948. 
Le gouvernement a approuvé la relocalisation de 100 travailleurs qualifiés et de 
leurs familles. Les autorités canadiennes croyaient que d’atténuer le problème 
des réfugiés au Moyen-Orient contribuerait favoriser la stabilité régionale. 
Le plan de relocalisation est demeuré une question politiquement délicate, car 
les gouvernements arabes ont protesté contre ce qu’ils percevaient comme un 
complot sioniste visant à chasser les Palestiniens de leur terre ancestrale. Pour le 
Canada, l’admission de réfugiés palestiniens en 1956 a constitué une importante 
« expérience » en ce qui a trait à la sélection future de réfugiés non européens et 
à leur relocalisation.
IN THE SUMMER of 1955, the Canadian government took the “bold step” 
of admitting displaced Palestinian refugees from the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. 
Canadian officials believed that alleviating the refugee problem in the Middle East 
would help in furthering regional stability. The resettlement scheme remained 
a politically sensitive issue as Arab governments protested against what they 
perceived as a Zionist plot to remove Palestinians from their ancestral land. 
The Canadian government approved the resettlement of 100 skilled workers 
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and their families. After several months of negotiations and preparations, a 
Canadian immigration team was dispatched in January 1956 to Beirut, Amman, 
and Jerusalem to conduct interviews, medical examinations, and Stage B security 
assessments.
 The resettlement of Palestinian refugees in 1956 receives scant attention from 
scholars and remains understudied in Canadian immigration historiography. In The 
Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948-1958, Zachariah Kay claims 
that the tentative decision to admit a limited number of English- and French-
speaking Palestinian refugees to Canada “was intended to be a modest gesture.”1 In 
Strangers at Our Gates, Valerie Knowles provides a brief overview and wonders 
why “this period has attracted little if any, attention from historians.”2 Nearly a 
decade later, David H. Goldberg and Tilly R. Shames mention Canada’s “tentative 
decision to admit a limited number of Palestinian refugees” in their article on 
Canada’s role in the Middle East refugee crisis.3 By contrast, earlier works such 
as Freda Hawkins’ Canada and Immigration, Gerald Dirks’ Canada’s Refugee 
Policy, Houchang Hassan-Yari’s Le Canada et le conflit Israélo-Arabe depuis 
1947, or more recently Ninette Kelly’s and Michael Trebilcock’s comprehensive 
study The Making of the Mosaic do not mention this movement.4 Why is this topic 
on the periphery of historical enquiry?
 In examining the evolution of Canadian immigration policy and practice 
during the 1950s, this paper argues that the admission of Palestinian refugees 
served as an important “experiment” for the future selection and resettlement of 
non-European refugees to Canada at a time when the 1952 Immigration Act and 
its regulations restricted non-European immigration. During this period, the Arab 
population in Canada numbered approximately 12,300 individuals.5 From 1945 to 
1956, Canada admitted 364 individuals who were identified as “Arabian.” With 
the removal of the term “racial” from the category “Origins of Immigrant Arrivals” 
in 1952, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics placed “Arabian” and other groups 
including “Chinese,” “East Indian,” “Indian (American),” “Japanese,” “Mexican,” 
“Negro,” “Syrian,” and “Turkish” under the subheading of “other.”6 From 1945 
1 Zachariah Kay, The Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948-1958 (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), p. 26.
2 Valerie Knowles, Forging Our Legacy: Canadian Citizenship and Immigration, 1900-1977 (Ottawa: 
Public Works and Government Services, 2000), pp. 73-74, and Strangers at Our Gates (Toronto: Dundurn 
Press, 2007), p. 173.
3 David H. Goldberg and Tilly R. Shames, “The ‘Good-Natured Bastard’: Canada and the Middle East 
Refugee Question,” Israel Affairs, vol. 10, nos. 1-2 (2004), p. 206.
4 See Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988); Gerald Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy: Indifference 
or Opportunism? (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977); Ninette Kelley and 
Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010).
5 Baha Abu-Laban, An Olive Branch on the Family Tree: The Arabs in Canada (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1980), pp. 58, 64; Paul Eid, Being Arab: Ethnic and Religious Identity Building among Second 
Generation Youth in Montreal (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), p. 8; 
Eliezer Tauber, “The Palestine Question in the 1940s and the Emergence of the Arab Lobby in Canada,” 
American Review of Canadian Studies, vol. 40, no. 4 (December 2010), p. 530.
6 Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce [hereafter DTC], Dominion Bureau of Statistics [hereafter 
DBS], The Canada Year Book, 1948-1949 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1949), p. 179; The Canada Year Book, 
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to the introduction of the Points system in 1967, a majority of Arabs who settled 
in Canada were either Christian or Muslim. A large number of these individuals 
were secular professionals educated in Western-type institutions.7 Postwar Arab 
newcomers chose to settle in areas where a pre-existing community existed. Since 
Montreal was home to the largest Arab population, followed by Toronto, a majority 
of Arab immigrants chose to reside in these two cities.8 Did the admission of 
these refugees alter existing Canadian views towards Arabs, the Middle East, and 
the Arab-Israeli conflict? Did Canada’s socio-cultural composition and economic 
demands shape the resettlement scheme? An examination of these questions sheds 
light on our understanding of this period.
Canada and the Partition of Palestine
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted 
Resolution 181, which would divide Palestine, formerly under British mandate, 
into Arab and Jewish states in May 1948. While a majority of Canadian newspaper 
editorials approved of the plan, the resolution was contentious from the beginning.9 
The publication of a Gallup Poll in early 1948 indicated that the Canadian public 
remained largely neutral on the issue of Palestine. Accordingly, 58 per cent of 
Canadian respondents remained indifferent, saying that their government had 
done enough to resolve the problem and that they did not wish their officials to 
become further involved. Nineteen per cent of those polled declared that they 
were sympathetic to the Jewish cause, while 23 per cent of individuals claimed 
they agreed with the Arab position. Newspapers across Canada expressed concern 
about arms shipments, British withdrawal, and foreign enlistments as the situation 
in the Middle East deteriorated further.10 Federal Cabinet ministers and officials 
within the Department of External Affairs believed that partition remained the 
only viable solution with enough support among the UN (United Nations) member 
states. Any failure by the UN to address the issue would severely weaken the new 
international organization.11
1950 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1950), p. 189; The Canada Year Book, 1951 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1951), 
p. 146; The Canada Year Book, 1952-53 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1953), p. 169; The Canada Year Book, 
1954 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1954), p. 163; The Canada Year Book, 1955 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
1955), p. 171; The Canada Year Book, 1956 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1956), p. 185; and The Canada Year 
Book, 1957-58 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1957), p. 181. European ethnic identities were categorized under 
“British” and “Continental European.”
7 Abu-Laban, An Olive Branch on the Family Tree, pp. 76-79; Eid, Being Arab, pp. 8-9. See also Farid 
E. Ohan and Ibrahim Hayani, The Arabs in Ontario: A Misunderstood Community (Toronto: Near East 
Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada, 1993), pp. 23-25.
8 Multiculturalism Directorate, Department of the Secretary of State, The Canadian Family Tree: Canada’s 
Peoples (Don Mills: Corpus Information Services, 1979), p. 19; Abu-Laban, An Olive Branch on the 
Family Tree, pp. 63-68.
9 Zachariah Kay, “The Canadian Press and Palestine: A Survey, 1939-48,” International Journal, vol. 18, 
no. 3 (1963), pp. 370-371.
10 Ibid. Kay notes that those who supported the Jewish cause gave a “common homeland and history, Jewish 
persecution, and the progress being made in the land” as their main reasons. Conversely, respondents who 
supported the Arab cause gave “Arab historical claims, [and] anti-semitic feelings” as their main reasons.
11 David J. Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 234-235; Anne Trowell Hillmer, “Pearson and Canadian Involvement in the 
Middle East” in David Taras and David Goldberg, eds., The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-
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 Arab Palestinians refused to recognize the resolution because it was seen as 
too favourable to Jews, and many opposed living in what would become Jewish 
territory.12 Partition led to a civil war between Jewish Palestinians, who later 
referred to it as the War of Independence, and Arab Palestinians, who viewed it 
as the Nakba or “catastrophe.” Following the announcement of the independence 
of Israel on May 14, 1948, five Arab states – Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Iraq – invaded the newly founded state. On December 11, 1948, UNGA adopted 
Resolution 194, which established a UN Conciliation Commission to facilitate 
peace between the Arab states and Israel. However, Israel and the Arab states 
refused to accept the resolution. The separately concluded Armistice Agreements 
between Israel and the Arab states in 1949 brought an end to the hostilities.13
 As a result of the Arab-Israeli War, approximately 750,000 Arab and Jewish 
Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes and land. The UN Conciliation 
Commission estimated that 711,000 Arab Palestinians and 39,000 Jewish 
Palestinians were displaced from the area that became Israel.14 In December 1949, 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
Israeli Conflict (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989), pp. 136-137.
12 As president of the Canadian Arab Friendship League, Muhammad Said Massoud asserted in the Canadian 
Arab that the Arab Canadian community was disappointed with Ottawa’s decision to support partition. 
Massoud had hoped that Canada would remain neutral. See Canadian Arab, vol. 3, nos. 7-8-9 (October-
November-December 1947) in Muhammad Said Massoud, I Fought as I Believed: An Arab Canadian 
Speaks Out on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Montreal: Ateliers des Sourds, 1976), pp. 63-64. See also Houda 
Asal, “Les premières mobilisations d’immigrants arabes au Canada, à travers l’exemple du journal The 
Canadian Arab, 1945-1948,” Journal of International Migration & Integration, vol. 9, no. 1 (Winter 
2008), p. 13. For Canadian Arab and Zionist perceptions of Ottawa’s role in the Partition of Palestine, 
see Zachariah Kay, Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment (Jerusalem: Israel University 
Press, 1978), pp. 115-126; David H. Goldberg, “Interest Groups and Foreign Policymaking,” Canadian 
Jewish Historical Society Journal, vol. 7, no. 1 (1983), pp. 28-35; Baha Abu-Laban, “Arab-Canadians 
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 114-116; Hassan 
Husseini, “A ‘Middle Power’ in Action: Canada and the Partition of Palestine,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 
vol. 30, no. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 49-50; Eliezer Tauber, Personal Policy Making: Canada’s Role in the 
Adoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002), pp. 109-115.
13 For an overview of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, see Efraim Karsh, Palestine Betrayed (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010); Nur Masalha, The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating 
the Subaltern, Reclaiming Memory (London: Zed Books, 2012); Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the 
First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), Righteous Victims: A History of the 
Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee 
Problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and The Birth of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ilan Pappé, A History of 
Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge, University Press, 2006), The Ethnic 
Cleansing of Palestine (London: Oneworld Publications, 2006), and The Making of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 1947-1951 (London: I. B. Taurus, 2006); Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., The War for 
Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ahmad H. Sa’di 
and Lila Abu-Lughod, eds., Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007); Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, 
and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) and Israel and Palestine: 
Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations (London: Verso, 2009); Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
14 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records: Fifth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/1367/Rev.1), 
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, “General Progress Report and Supplementary 
Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Covering the Period from 11 
December 1949 to 23 October 1950” (New York, 1951), http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/93037E3
B939746DE8525610200567883 (accessed October 24, 2013).
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East (UNRWA) was established to provide relief and human development for 
Palestinian refugees displaced by the events of 1948. By the mid-1950s, Canada 
had become the organization’s fourth largest financial contributor. The federal 
government’s involvement in the Middle East refugee crisis was predicated on 
two principles. Canadian officials believed that any resolution to the displacement 
of Arab and Jewish Palestinians had to be a multilateral effort sanctioned by the 
United Nations. In addition, officials in Ottawa believed that a resolution of the 
refugee problem was a “necessary condition” for any comprehensive political and 
military settlement between Israel and its Arab opponents.15 In the interim, the 
Canadian government resorted to practical actions – which included a scheme to 
resettle a number of Palestinians – in its attempts to alleviate the refugee crisis in 
the Middle East.
Regulating Immigration from the Middle East
In the summer of 1951, the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. The convention defined a refugee as any individual who
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it.16
Palestinian refugees were originally excluded from the 1951 UN Convention 
because they were “persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies 
of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees protection or assistance.”17 There also remains no definitive response 
to who is a Palestinian refugee. Political sociologist Riccardo Bocco asserts that 
“the definition and the number of Palestinian refugees can differ according to the 
approach (administrative, juridical, political) used to define Palestinian refugees 
and also according to the social context of interaction between Palestinians 
(registered or not) and others and the actors defining them.”18 On May 1, 
15 Goldberg and Shames, “The ‘Good-Natured Bastard’,” p. 204.
16 Michael Lanphier, “Canada’s Response to Refugees,” International Migration Review, vol. 15, nos. 1-2 
(1981), pp. 113-114.
17 Article 1D of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states: “This 
Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United 
Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance. When 
such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being 
definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.” See United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html (accessed October 17, 2014), p. 16.
18 Riccardo Bocco, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History within History,” Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, vol. 28, nos. 2-3 (2010), pp. 237-238.
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1950, UNRWA commenced its mandate without a clear definition of who was 
a Palestinian refugee. In an effort to define the number of relief recipients, an 
official definition was established two years later and remains unchanged: “a 
Palestinian refugee shall mean any person whose normal place of residence was 
Palestine during the period June 1, 1946 to May 15, 1948, and who lost both home 
and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.”19 The UNRWA definition 
included both Arab and Jewish refugees from Palestine.
 The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees came into 
force on April 22, 1954. Canada did not become a signatory to the UN Convention, 
however, because of concerns from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
regarding the admission of undesirable individuals who posed a security threat to 
the country. The RCMP feared that the UN Convention would restrict Canada’s 
efforts to deport individuals deemed as “security risks” because it guaranteed 
asylum as an international human right. Officials in Ottawa used the Convention 
as a framework that would guide their efforts in admitting and denying prospective 
immigrants, but the Canadian government continued to use Orders-in-Council and 
Cabinet Directives to grant entry. As a result, Palestinian refugees remained at 
the mercy of Immigration Branch officials and the RCMP who enforced Stage 
B security screening.20 Immigration Branch officials worked closely with the 
RCMP to implement the immigrant security vetting process known as Stage B. 
Once an applicant was interviewed by a visa officer and underwent a medical 
examination, the prospective immigrant was then screened for potential security 
issues including, but not limited to, criminal activity, espionage, and communist 
sympathies.21
 In June 1954, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) informed officials 
within the Immigration Branch that three new diplomatic posts were to be opened 
in the Middle East in October with Beirut, Cairo, and Tel Aviv the likely locations. 
Due to under-staffing and illness, the Canadian Legation in Beirut continued to 
rely on the Visa Section of the British Embassy to handle immigration cases until 
January 16, 1955, when Vice Consul Michael Shenstone arrived to manage the 
portfolio.22 In Tel Aviv, newly arrived A. J. Desjardins immediately began to deal 
19 United Nations Relief and Works Agency, “Who We Are: Palestine Refugees,” http://www.unrwa.org/
who-we-are (accessed October 15, 2014). Palestinian Arab and Jewish refugees who fled or willingly left 
UNRWA’s areas of operations were not registered with the agency. The definition also contained a gender 
bias as Palestinian refugee status could only be passed to successive generations by a registered refugee 
male. A registered refugee woman who married a non-refugee male lost her status (but could regain it 
through divorce or widowhood). See Bocco, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees,” pp. 237-238.
20 In June 1969, Ottawa ratified the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
21 See Alvin Finkel, “Canadian Immigration Policy and the Cold War, 1945-1980,” Journal of Canadian 
Studies, vol. 21, no. 3 (1986), pp. 53-70.
22 Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC], Immigration Branch fonds [hereafter IB], RG 76, vol. 785, 
file 541-25-7, part 1, “Canadian Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon – General File,” letter from R. M. Macdonald 
for Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration, Ottawa, June 23, 1954; “Canadian Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon – General File,” memorandum 
no. 27 from Chargé d’affaires, Canadian Legation in Beirut, Lebanon to Under-Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, Ottawa, November 9, 1954; and “Canadian Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon – General File,” 
memorandum no. 27 from Elizabeth Pauline MacCallum, Chargé d’affaires, Canadian Legation in Beirut, 
Lebanon to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, January 14, 1955.
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with the backlog of applications from Canadians seeking to sponsor an Israeli 
relative.23 In the early 1950s, Canadian policy towards the Middle East mirrored 
initiatives in London and Washington. Ottawa had yet to implement an advanced 
policy for the Middle East and maintained few representatives in the region.24
 In assessing Arab-Israeli relations, Under-Secretary for External Affairs Jules 
Léger concluded that, to ease tensions between Arab states and Israel, a solution to 
the refugee problem had to be found. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, Léger argued that “before any positive step can be taken the 
Arabs must accept two facts: that Israel has come to stay and that, except for a 
very few, most of the refugees will be resettled in Arab lands. Even at the risk of 
antagonizing the Arab leaders, no opportunity should be lost to persuade them to 
move in that direction.”25 A day later, on March 25, 1955, before the House of 
Commons, Leader of the Official Opposition John Diefenbaker asked government 
members how long Ottawa had contributed to international efforts on behalf of 
the Palestinian refugees and how many of these refugees were beneficiaries of 
Canadian grants. Minister of Finance Walter Edward Harris replied that, since 
the inception of UNRWA in 1949, Canada had contributed annually for a total 
amount of $3,555,929. Harris also noted that Canada had become the fourth 
largest contributor to UNRWA after the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France. In his response to the Minister of Finance, Diefenbaker stated:
There is no more difficult problem anywhere in the world, I would think, than one 
dealing with refugees. I personally spoke with a number of the refugees and learned 
that they realized Canada was making this contribution toward the alleviation of 
their condition ... certainly there is no sorer spot than these camps which, as one 
visits them and leaves them, cannot help but impress one with the awfulness of the 
situation in which these people find themselves. The minister mentioned Canada’s 
contribution, and I think that is one contribution that does leave an impression upon 
the people who receive it. In addition, it is building a bulwark against the spread of 
communism in these areas.26
In his question to the Minister of Finance, Social Credit Leader Solon Earl Low 
demanded to know whether Canadian officials “made fairly strong representations” 
as to whether contributions for Palestinian refugees were for simple maintenance 
23 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 785, file 541-25-7, part 1, “Canadian Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon – General 
File,” letter from Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, to Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ottawa, November 25, 1954.
24 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984 (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2007), p. 264; Michael Carroll, Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United 
Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), p. 10.
25 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [hereafter DFAIT], Documents on 
Canadian External Relations [hereafter DCER], vol. 21, chap. 6, Middle East, part 2, Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, file DEA/50134-40, secret memorandum from Jules Léger, Under-Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, to Lester Bowles Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, March 
24, 1955, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-06-03/www.international.gc.ca/
department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1623 (accessed November 6, 2013).
26 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, House of Commons Debates: Official Report, Second Session 
– Twenty-Second Parliament, Volume 3 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1955), 
p. 2400.
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or for their rehabilitation. In his reply to the Social Credit leader, Harris indicated 
that the Canadian government was “satisfied that there is good evidence that 
the problem now is being looked upon as one which must be solved by way of 
rehabilitation and in other ways.” Before his fellow members, the Minister of 
Finance declined to state what solutions Canadian officials were contemplating.27
 On April 6, Social Credit MP for Wetaskiwin, Ray Thomas, declared:
I think too, it is about time that we told them that unless the United Nations 
rehabilitation contributions to the Arab refugees are used for rehabilitation they will 
be stopped. I believe these payments have gone on long enough for the maintenance 
of those people in the refugee camps. It is about time they were forced to get out and 
make their own way somehow. It should be made perfectly clear to them that any 
further rehabilitation grants for the refugees will be used for rehabilitation only and 
not for maintenance within the camps.28
Canadian Public Perceptions and Press Reaction
Throughout 1955, public opinion remained split over the plight of displaced 
Palestinian refugees. Canadian residents submitted letters to newspapers across 
the country to express their views regarding events in the Middle East. As two 
Canadian dailies with large readerships, the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Daily 
Star played their part as platforms that published the heated debates between 
concerned citizens who expressed a multitude of opinions supporting Israeli or 
Arab interests. Although not entirely representative of all the letters Canadians 
were sending to their local newspapers, they do give us insight into the content 
and extent of the debate regarding the plight of Palestinian refugees. The Globe 
and Mail featured letters from concerned Canadians under the headline “800,000 
Arab refugees from Palestine.” In his letter to the newspaper, H. A. Mowat of 
Toronto argued that supplies for the Palestinan Arab refugees should come from 
the Arab governments that had attacked Israel in 1948. According to Mowat, 
the Arab armies had created the refugee camps and were therefore ultimately 
responsible in providing for the resulting refugees along Israel’s borders.29 In 
a more moderate response, Dorothy Johnson of Toronto indicated that she had 
spent approximately two years among the refugees working for a non-political 
and non-denominational organization that had welfare and medical teams among 
the children in the camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Johnson asserted that, 
although many of the refugees were illiterate, they were not against progress and 
were ready to learn. The former aid worker stressed that Western intervention was 
the wrong course since Arab states viewed Israel as a Western state and a danger 
to them. In Johnson’s view, a solution “can only come with future generations 
who understand that the interests of their respective countries are allied and that 
together they may prosper, divided they will not.”30 In his letter to the Globe 
and Mail, C. Horowitz of Toronto argued that “the Jews have a historic right to 
27 Ibid., pp. 2400-2401.
28 Ibid., p. 2882.
29 “The 800,000 Arab Refugees from Palestine,” Globe and Mail, June 13, 1955, p. 6.
30 Ibid.
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Palestine.” Horowitz claimed that the Arabs “have let the country go to waste, and 
the land of milk and honey was transformed into a desert, which the Jews are now 
endeavouring, by the sweat of their brow, to rehabilitate, and are succeeding.” 
The letter also indicated that seven Arab states invaded Israel after its declaration 
of independence on May 14, 1948, in order to “wipe the Jewish country off the 
map.” Horowitz concluded that the Palestinian refugees found themselves outside 
Israel’s borders due to neighbouring Arab states and, as a result, “I don’t see 
how anyone with any brains can demand that Israel should admit its sworn worst 
enemies.”31
 In the Toronto Daily Star, reader Nadji Shukri of Toronto responded to a 
letter from a Mr. Singer who claimed that Palestine belonged to the Jews. In his 
reply, Shukri noted that no form of compensation had been given to displaced 
Palestinians after 1948 and claimed that Israel “refuses to admit any more than 
about 34,000 of those who fled. Does Mr. Singer consider this a generous offer?”32 
In a reply to Shukri’s comments a few days later, Dave Jessel of University College, 
Toronto, declared that Arab states prevented the refugees from permanently 
settling anywhere. Their predicament was being used as a propaganda tool against 
Israel, while the UN fed and clothed the refugees, thus “handling their troubles 
for them.” Jessel concluded that “it, therefore, appears that those who by their 
aggression against Israel created the refugee problem are now the injured party 
which has to be appeased.”33
 Prominent officials, respected religious leaders, and newspaper editors also 
voiced their opinions on the plight of the Palestinian refugees. In a special 
feature for the Toronto Daily Star, Anglican Canon A. H. Davis reported on his 
travels through refugee camps in Jordan, where approximately 400,000 displaced 
Palestinians resided. Davis came away from his experience with appreciation 
for international efforts to provide financial and material assistance to refugees 
in Jordan. According to the Canon, “it is obvious to any visitor that a program 
of resettlement for these refugees is beyond the means of any Arab state, or 
combination of states, without financial assistance for many years to come.”34 
In an editorial published in September 1955, the Globe and Mail presented its 
view of the “Dilemma in the Middle East.” With news that Egypt was considering 
purchasing arms from Czechoslovakia, the newspaper argued, Western powers 
could not afford to take sides between Egypt and Israel. In essence, the newspaper 
explored the dilemma of “how to be friends of both Jews and Arabs and how to 
keep the precarious Middle Eastern peace.” The paper concluded that, for the 
Western powers,
[the] most fruitful form of intervention, though it would necessarily be laborious 
and long-termed, is an effort to persuade Jews and Arabs to work together on 
practical schemes for their common advantage. There is, of course, a strong contrast 
31 Ibid.
32 “Disputes Israel Claim,” Toronto Daily Star, October 29, 1955, p. 6.
33 “The Arab Refugees,” Toronto Daily Star, November 1, 1955, p. 6.
34 “Wall with Sentry Typical of Way Jerusalem Divided,” Toronto Daily Star, October 28, 1955, p. 16.
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between the industrious Jews and the not so industrious Arabs with their ingrained 
contempt for Western ideas of efficiency and progress. Arabs, however, need food, 
clothing, and shelter like other people ... it is hard to believe that the Arabs can resist 
the attraction of the Jordan schemes or would resist plans, put before them with 
diplomatic skill, for the resettlement of the Palestinian Arab refugees now huddled 
on Israel’s borders.35
According to the Globe and Mail, peace in the Middle East could only be achieved 
through economic partnership and advancement. 
 With public opinion over escalating tensions in the Middle East and the plight 
of approximately 900,000 displaced Palestinian refugees hanging in the balance, 
the federal government planned to contribute an additional $500,000 to UNRWA 
to provide assistance to Palestinian refugees. Approximately, $300,000 of the 
allocated funds was used to purchase wheat. The DEA also noted that Ottawa 
would contribute an additional $125,000 to the 1956 programme of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).36 On May 26, 1955, the Director of 
Placement Services in the Rehabilitation Division at the headquarters of UNRWA 
asked the Canadian Legation in Beirut, Lebanon, whether Canada would be 
willing to resettle a “moderate number of refugees as immigrants.”37
 A month later, Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr. Fawzi made an official visit 
to Ottawa. In his discussions with the Egyptian minister, Secretary of State for 
External Affairs Lester Bowles Pearson indicated that the claims of Palestinian 
refugees to full compensation for material damage would have to be “admitted 
and met” before any negotiated settlement could take place. In his reply, Fawzi 
declared that such compensation would most likely not be met. Fawzi concluded 
that, if Israel was not willing or able to pay compensation, then the UN should 
accept some part of the obligation. According to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, 
“it would be a small price to pay for peace.”38
Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees to Canada
On September 8, 1955, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affaires, 
Jules Léger, sent a confidential letter to the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, Colonel Laval Fortier. In his letter, the under-secretary indicated that 
Canada had contributed approximately $4 million for Palestine relief and it was in 
35 “Dilemma in the Middle East,” Globe and Mail, September 29, 1955, p. 6.
36 “Canada Plans $500,000 Relief Aid to Palestine,” Vancouver Sun, November 4, 1955, p. 49. The article 
noted that Canada remained the fourth largest financial contributor to the fund. In previous years, Canada’s 
contributions totalled $4 million.
37 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” despatch 
no. 33 from Elizabeth Pauline MacCallum, Chargé d’affaires, Canadian Legation, Beirut, Lebanon to 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, February 6, 1956.
38 Canada, DFAIT, DCER, vol. 21, chap. 6, Middle East, part 3, Egypt, section A, Visit of Foreign Minister 
to Ottawa, June 28-30, 1955, file DEA/10170-C-40, confidential memorandum from Lester Bowles 
Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to Jules Léger, Under-Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, Ottawa, July 1, 1955, http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-06-03/www.
international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=1626 (accessed November 
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Vintage Books, 1993), p. 123.
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Canada’s interest “that the refugees be resettled as soon as possible since the only 
practical alternative is for members of the United Nations, including Canada, to 
continue to share in the cost of maintaining them indefinitely.”39 Headquartered in 
Beirut, UNRWA sought to resettle Palestinian refugees permanently on a “highly 
selective basis” with backing from the United States.
 Canada’s Director of Immigration C. E. S. Smith wrote a confidential letter 
to the RCMP Special Branch on September 15, 1955, regarding a question that 
UNRWA had sent to the DEA “whether Canada would consider accepting a 
limited number of Palestinian refugees for resettlement in Canada.” According 
to UNRWA, 905,986 registered Palestinian refugees were residing in camps 
in Jordan (499,606 – 55.2 per cent), Gaza (214,601 – 23.7 per cent), Lebanon 
(103,600 – 11.4 per cent), and Syria (88,179 – 9.7 per cent).40 Smith noted that 
these refugees were predominantly unable to secure employment in their host 
country due to a lack of technical skills and professional training. In some cases, 
the refugees were taught English and acquired training from UNRWA staff. The 
Director of Immigration concluded his letter to the RCMP by requesting an 
analysis of the Stage B (medical and security screening) considerations prior to 
the possible movement of Palestinian refugees to Canada.41
 Three weeks later, the Canadian Legation in Beirut informed the Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa that UNRWA officials continued 
to pressure Canadian diplomats for a response regarding the “emigration to Canada 
of selected Palestine refugees.” Legation officials were concerned that UNRWA 
would also contact other Commonwealth governments in the hopes of resettling 
refugees. Canada’s first female Head of Mission and Chargé d’affaires in Beirut, 
Elizabeth Pauline MacCallum, indicated that the informal scheme favoured by 
UNRWA should be seen as an advantage to Canada, in that the agency would 
complement its assistance with Canadian immigration regulations.42
39 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” confidential 
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 In their informal discussions with Canadian representatives in Beirut, UNRWA 
officials indicated that the desire to resettle Palestinian refugees came from officials 
within the agency’s Division of Placement Services. These officials pointed out 
that the Director of UNRWA had not participated in planning this scheme, as the 
agency’s success in receiving cooperation from other refugee organizations and 
Arab governments was contingent on “maintaining a strictly neutral position on 
the vexed question of permanent resettlement of refugees outside of Palestine.”43
 As discussions were taking place between UNRWA and Canadian legation 
officials, the United States government undertook a scheme to resettle 2,000 
Palestinian refugees who received non-quota visas as sponsored immigrants 
under the 1953 Refugee Relief Act. In shedding light on the type of immigrant 
Palestinians could be, MacCallum wrote to Pearson arguing that the Palestinian 
refugees were
extremely fine people, well educated, efficient, hard-working, adaptable and 
capable of enduring stoically a great deal of hardship. Some are “graduates” of 
UNRWA, having escaped from relief either by their own efforts or through training 
given by the agency. In a country like Lebanon, where work is not available for all, 
and competition for jobs is intense enough even among members of the indigenous 
population, it is greatly to the credit of the community that so many Palestinian 
refugees are allowed to make a living, despite the difficulty of obtaining citizenship 
and work permits. In Jordan, where refugees are welcomed as citizens, the labour 
that only a small population of those refugees not on relief can regard their economic 
position as being anything but precarious.44
The majority of Palestinian refugees living in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria 
were agricultural workers and peasants with no formal education or language 
training. Most sought to remain and cultivate the land of their ancestors. 
Conversely, a minority of the refugees acquired skills, professional training, and 
the ability to work in the English language. Canadian officials were to select 
prospective refugees for resettlement from this small group who desired to secure 
employment and a better life for themselves and their families in Canada.45 
Officials were concerned whether they would be able to ascertain the status of 
each applicant for resettlement. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
proposed facilitating Canadian immigration authorities with certificates that 
would authenticate each Palestinian applicant. In turn, Canadian officials were 
well aware that they would need to amend their administrative regulations in order 
to attract “the best type of immigrant.” A Palestinian refugee who – prior to the 
partition of Palestine – had resided in territory now comprising the state of Israel 
and who was now living in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, or Gaza would be considered 
as a refugee. Additionally, every Palestinian refugee certified by UNRWA would 
43 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” numbered 
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be considered eligible for resettlement in Canada.46 Cases in which resettlement 
was uncertain would be referred to Ottawa and adjudicated on an “ad hoc basis.” 
For those Palestinian refugees whom the Canadian government deemed to be 
“economic refugees” because they had inhabited land near the demarcation line 
and were without a livelihood, further analysis was required to move forward. 
Approximately 100,000 individuals found themselves in this predicament and 
were without UNRWA assistance.47
 Canadian diplomats in Beirut were well aware that many of the Palestinian 
refugees seeking resettlement did not possess valid travelling documents. In 
Lebanon, many refugees were forced to purchase Lebanese passports with falsified 
information to establish residency and be able to gain employment. According to 
Canadian Chargé d’affaires G. F. G. Hughes, the American Embassy in Beirut 
“attempted to be as lenient as possible in such cases” as the travel documents 
were acquired for the purposes of sustenance and not to enter the United States 
illegally.48 Canadian officials in Lebanon were interested in American procedures 
towards preparing their own scheme for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees. 
Under the Refugee Relief Act, American officials granted visas only to applicants 
who could guarantee that they would be readmitted back into the country from 
which they had come, and Canadian officials also found this measure necessary. 
Hughes argued to his superiors that, if Canada were to accept Palestinian refugees, 
“it would presumably be necessary to ensure that Canada had the right to return 
refugees to their country of last permanent residence within a stipulated time of 
say, one year, if the immigrants proved to be unsuitable in one way or another.”49
 The Canadian Legation in Beirut forwarded to Ottawa a list containing the 
names of 27,335 Palestinians registered for employment with UNRWA. These 
persons were classified by trade and country of residence. As UNRWA had agreed 
to facilitate the testing of registrants to guarantee their skills and training, Canadian 
officials sought to resettle refugees through sponsorship or as open placements 
in particular trades. The list indicated that most of the registrants were artisans 
including plumbers, painters, mechanics, fitters, riveters, and surveyor assistants, 
primarily in their twenties, forties, or fifties.50 In terms of assistance, UNRWA 
was prepared to pay for the passage of individuals who received their visas from 
Canadian authorities and were in receipt of food rations. The agency was willing 
to provide medical examinations and to give every head of household $28 and $14 
for each dependent upon departure.
 On the morning of October 26, 1955 an interdepartmental meeting was held to 




49 Ibid. The Canadian government would need to request that Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria issue one-year re-
entry permits for individuals without the proper travel documentation. The Canadian Legation in Beirut 
was also interested in promoting the resettlement of Palestinian refugees to Canada through sponsorship. 
Although the Palestinian community in Canada was relatively small, Canadian diplomats floated the idea 
of soliciting applications from relatives who could ascertain a prospective refugee’s identity.
50 Ibid.
Canada’s Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees
458 Histoire sociale / Social History
In attendance were C. E. S. Smith and four representatives from the Department 
of Citizenship and Immigration, Paul Malone from the United Nations Division 
within the DEA, W. W. Dawson from the Department of Labour, J. W. Temple 
from the Unemployment Insurance Commission, and Inspector G. H. Ashley from 
the RCMP. As Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, John Whitney Pickersgill 
led the federal government’s efforts to accept and resettle Palestinian refugees. 
Pickersgill sent the members a memorandum informing them of the federal 
Cabinet’s view of the issue. The meeting was to decide whether Palestinian 
refugees would be permitted to enter Canada and, if so, how many. Since the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was responsible for crafting a resettlement 
policy and shaping its implementation, Pickersgill requested that departmental 
representatives resolve the issue of how the refugees “could be integrated into the 
Canadian economy, the sources from which such refugees should be selected and 
the timing of the movement.”51 The meeting resulted in a consensus that a small 
number of Palestinian refugees be admitted to Canada. Federal Cabinet ministers 
believed that accepting refugees from Palestine might lead other countries to do 
the same and concluded that reducing the refugee dilemma in the Middle East was 
a “useful piece of strategy,” given that the large number of Palestinian refugees 
in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria posed a threat to regional stability.52 The 
departmental representatives agreed that, since the federal government could 
not ascertain individual levels of trade proficiency, a small “experiment” of 
admitting only 100 workers and their families would be allowed to evaluate how 
a relatively small group of Palestinian refugees, numbering approximately 300 to 
400 people, would integrate into the Canadian economy.53 The federal Cabinet’s 
decision to accept a small number of Palestinian refugees in the fall of 1955 and 
Pickersgill’s role in determining policy and shaping resettlement efforts proved 
to be an instrumental lesson in refugee resettlement. Less than a year later, the 
experiment of resettling Palestinian refugees served as an important precedent for 
the resettlement of tens of thousands of Britons and other Europeans spurred to 
emigrate during the Suez Crisis, as well as 37,500 Hungarian refugees who fled 
the Soviet invasion of their homeland in 1956.
 The interdepartmental meeting also discussed the timing of the movement of 
Palestinian refugees to Canada. Representatives agreed that a timeline would be 
confirmed at a later date once the duration of Stage B security screening, conducted 
by the RCMP, became clear. Inspector G. H. Ashley argued convincingly that the 
Palestinian refugee should be defined as “any Arab displaced as a result of the 
Israeli-Arab war” of 1948. The inspector’s definition was approved by the other 
representatives. Those refugees chosen for resettlement were also to receive a 
51 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” minutes 
of meeting, October 26, 1955, with letter from C. E. S. Smith, Director of Immigration, to Jules Léger, 
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, November 2, 1955.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid. Chargé d’affaires G. F. G. Hughes indicated that a “token number of 500 refugees” could be brought 
to Canada.
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medical pre-screening by UNRWA that would be reviewed by Canadian doctors 
upon their arrival in Canada.54
 On October 27, 1955, director of Immigration C. E. S. Smith wrote to Paul 
Malone at the DEA informing him that the Immigration Branch had reclassified 
the Palestinian refugees from UNRWA’s list in accordance with the International 
Labour Organization’s International Classification of Occupations for Migration, 
Employment and Placement. Of the 23 occupations listed, the largest group 
of refugees with a particular trade consisted of 738 carpenters and joiners, 
followed by 629 automotive mechanics and 487 stonemasons and construction 
workers. Conversely, Canadian immigration authorities identified only five 
electrical engineers, 10 mechanical engineers, and an additional 10 draughtsmen 
for placement in Canada. The remaining Palestinians on Canada’s short list 
included tailors, typists, pipefitters, welders, painters, non-professional nurses, 
housekeepers, cooks, and bakers.55
 On November 9, Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Colonel 
Laval Fortier informed his minister that Canada would admit 100 Palestinian 
refugees and their families for a total of between 300 and 400 people. This wave 
of immigration would be considered experimental, and the admission of future 
refugees depended on the success of the first group to arrive in Canada. The 
selection of refugees was to occur only in Jordan and Lebanon as facilities for 
the security screening of individuals were considered to be inadequate in Syria 
and Egypt.56 In a confidential memorandum to the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, DEA officials noted that “as a rule, largely because of a lack of facilities 
for the security screening of persons wishing to immigrate into Canada from Egypt 
(a reason not disclosed to applicants nor presumably to the Egyptian authorities), 
no encouragement is given to such immigration.”57 A Canadian immigration 
54 Ibid. At the meeting, officials representing the Immigration Branch were also concerned with the ability of 
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average size of their families.
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team was to be sent to Jordan and Lebanon in late January or early February 
1956 to process refugee applications pre-selected by UNRWA. The immigration 
team and the agency were to process these applications with “extreme caution” 
to avoid criticism from Arab governments and refugee applicants themselves.58 
The Canadian government required successful Palestinian applicants to speak 
either English or French, to have occupations for which employment possibilities 
existed as identified by the Canadian government, and to be able to adapt to life in 
Canada and become good citizens.59
 Canadian officials were cognizant of the fact that UNRWA’s status with Arab 
governments in the Middle East could suffer should it be seen as taking the 
initiative in encouraging and resettling Palestinians abroad. In representing Arab 
governments, the Arab League urged for the repatriation of Palestinian refugees 
in accordance with UNGA’s resolution of December 11, 1948. The Arab League 
remained concerned that the resettlement of refugees abroad would adversely 
affect their ability to return to their pre-1948 homes. Canadian officials were 
forced to maintain that they only sought to resettle individuals who desired to 
reside permanently in Canada.60 In a confidential telegram to the DEA, Canadian 
Chargé d’affaires Elizabeth Pauline MacCallum suggested that the Canadian 
government permit the embassy to issue a press release on behalf of UNRWA that 
would “protect its position and prevent criticism from disappointed applicants” 
and from Arab governments by indicating that a large number of Palestinian 
refugees had requested immigration to Canada and that Ottawa had “tentatively 
decided to admit a very limited number of applicants” residing in Lebanon and 
Jordan who spoke either English or French and held relevant technical skills.61 
MacCallum noted that UNRWA officials felt confident that a press release would 
eliminate most ineligible applicants as well as criticism of both Canada and the 
agency. The Canadian Chargé d’affaires also asserted that UNRWA’s experience 
in resettling Palestinian refugees to the United States had indicated that refugees 
who were rejected did not publicly resent the American government.62 In Ottawa, 
federal officials recognized that UNRWA’s position in the Middle East remained 
delicate. One of the main accusations made by Arab governments in the region 
p. 35.
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was that the organization was an “Anglo-American tool designed to frustrate 
the recognized right of the refugees to return to their Palestinian homeland by 
encouraging them to seek permanent resettlement elsewhere.” Both UNRWA and 
the Canadian legation in Beirut agreed that full publicity of the plan to resettle 
Palestinian refugees to Canada would limit criticism.63
 Accordingly, in the early morning of December 2, 1955, the DEA issued a press 
release in Ottawa and Beirut announcing that Canada had “tentatively decided to 
admit a limited number of Palestinian refugees as immigrants to Canada.” The 
press release noted that, since Canada was the fourth largest financial contributor to 
UNRWA, it sought to promote the welfare of Palestinian refugees. While Canadian 
officials were crafting the press release, Moshe Sharrett, Israel’s Foreign Minister, 
visited Ottawa where he engaged in talks with Pearson. Sharett informed Canada’s 
Secretary of State for External Affairs “how impossible it would be for Israel to 
take back a large number of refugees and, apart from the security problem, there 
was simply no place where they could be resettled.” The Israeli Foreign Minister 
stated “that Israel was ready to pay compensation for their lands and to help in 
their resettlement in the Arab countries as part of a general settlement.”64 In the 
following days and weeks, newspapers across the Middle East reacted to Canada’s 
press release. In Beirut, Al-Jarida (December 3) claimed the Canadian resettlement 
scheme was made public during the visit of Israel’s Foreign Minister, as if to 
suggest it was in part an Israeli plot. Al-Yom (December 4) viewed the Canadian 
plan unfavourably and through interviews noted that “not a single refugee in Syria 
had asked to emigrate to Canada.” In Damascus, Alef-Ba (December 3) “violently 
criticize[d]” the Canadian announcement under the headline “Dangerous Western 
Plot to Expatriate Refugees and Bury Them in Oblivion in Canada.” A week 
later in Jerusalem, Falastin (December 10) published an article entitled “Arab 
Refugees: Forbidding Them from Emigrating to Canada.” In the feature, the paper 
claimed that Damascus planned to request other Arab governments to prevent the 
emigration of Palestinian refugees to Canada.65
 Due to a lack of Canadian immigration facilities in Lebanon and Jordan, 
UNRWA remained responsible for pre-selecting Palestinian candidates for 
immigration to Canada.66 The team of immigration officials dispatched to approve 
UNRWA’s selections were to be sent to the large refugee centres of Beirut, Amman, 
and Jerusalem. A medical officer was to accompany the Canadian team and assess 
reports from UNRWA’s medical examinations, which included an examination of 
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each prospective Palestinian candidate’s chest x-rays, a radiologist’s report, and 
tests which looked for evidence of syphilis and checked faeces for parasites. In 
Ottawa, the Department of National Health and Welfare informed immigration 
officials that further tests were to be conducted including an urinalysis for sugar 
and albumin (globular proteins).67
 Aside from medical examinations, Canadian officials also focused on selecting 
prospective candidates with linguistic abilities and trade experience. They were 
also concerned with the socio-economic impact of this wave of immigration since 
each successful candidate would be permitted to resettle in Canada with his or 
her immediate family. In her correspondence with the DEA, MacCallum noted 
that the average size of Palestinian refugee families was 4.5 persons, of which the 
nominal head was a male aged 50 to 55. Due to past uprootedness, many of these 
families depended largely on a younger male between 25 and 30 years of age as 
the “eligible immigrant” who would bring his immediate family, including a father 
and a mother, to Canada. MacCallum also counselled officials in Ottawa – who 
worried about the lack of private sponsorship – that an earlier American scheme 
to resettle 2,000 Palestinian refugees had also suffered from a lack of private 
interest. With the arrival in the United States of the first group of refugees, private 
citizens and non-governmental organizations began to show interest in the form of 
increased sponsorship. According to the Canadian Chargé d’affaires, Americans 
had previously envisioned Palestinians as “a type of wild Bedouin,” but were 
now “enabled to see with their own eyes that the Palestinian Arabs are, on the 
contrary, a civilized and assimilable group.”68 Even as linguistic ability and skills 
experience were heavily considered, the DEA informed the Canadian Legation 
in Beirut that the main criterion in selecting Palestinian refugees for resettlement 
remained their “over-all suitability and adaptability to life in Canada.” As a result, 
only “normal family units” comprised of a wage earner and his wife and children 
would be considered eligible.69
 The Immigration Branch informed its Officer-in-Charge in Athens on 
December 15, 1955, that a federal Cabinet directive had been issued to “admit a 
limited number of specially selected Palestinian refugee for permanent resettlement 
in Canada.” The directive noted the Cabinet’s decision was based on two points. 
First, through UNRWA, Canada was the fourth largest financial contributor to 
Palestinian relief, and, in attempting to resettle these refugees, Canada hoped 
that other countries would also implement resettlement schemes. Second, the 
significant number of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East represented a threat 
to regional stability. Federal Cabinet ministers believed that, with the region’s 
67 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” letter 
from C. E. S. Smith, Director of Immigration, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 
December 8, 1955, p. 2; and “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” memorandum from C. E. S. Smith, 
Director of Immigration, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, December 29, 1955.
68 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” numbered 
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to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, November 17, 1955.
69 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” message 
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increasing strategic importance, relieving the refugee problem would improve the 
political situation. The directive incorporated recommendations from Canadian 
officials in Beirut and the interdepartmental committee and went further to 
suggest that the age limit of heads of household not exceed 45 years. Assisted 
transportation would not be provided, and successful candidates and their families 
would be expected to pay for their passage to Canada. Sponsorships would only 
be accepted after Palestinian refugees arrived in Canada. The Cabinet expected 
immigration officials to complete their selection of Palestinian refugees prior to 
January 30, 1956.70
 Canadian immigration officials believed that successful Palestinian refugees 
should be resettled in Central and Eastern Canada as far west as Port Arthur, 
Ontario. Director of Immigration C. E. S. Smith informed his colleagues in 
the DEA that his department envisioned that 100 heads of household would 
permanently reside as follows: 25 persons each in Montreal and Toronto, 10 each 
in Port Arthur and Quebec City, and five each in Hull, Trois-Rivières, Hamilton, 
London, Ottawa, and Windsor. Upon their arrival in Canada, Palestinian refugees 
were to report to their local Immigration Office, which would be responsible for 
finding accommodations and employment. Short-term assistance in the form of 
food and shelter would be handled by Immigration Halls in Montreal and Quebec 
or through private assistance.71
 Throughout January 1956 Arab newspapers across the Middle East published 
articles in an attempt to shed further light on the Canadian resettlement scheme 
and to promote popular opposition to the movement of Palestinian refugees to 
Canada. In Amman, Al Difa’ (January 26) noted that the Jordanian Minister of 
Social Welfare had called on Arab governments to thwart the Canadian plan. 
In Beirut, the Daily Star (January 26) argued that Palestinian refugees in Syria 
had protested to the Syrian and Lebanese government to prevent young refugees 
from immigrating to Canada. L’Orient (February 1) informed its readers under 
the headline “N’émigrez pas au Canada” (“Don’t emigrate to Canada”) that the 
Palestinian High Committee led by the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-
Husseini, called on all Palestinian refugees to remain on guard against Canadian 
efforts in Lebanon and Jordan to resettle them.72
 In Canada, members of Parliament continued an intense debate on the situation 
in the Middle East. In his address before the House of Commons on January 18, 
1956, Co-operative Commonwealth Federation MP for Winnipeg North, Alistair 
McLeod Stewart, declared that, while over 900,000 Palestinian refugees lived in 
poverty and misery, Arab nations had failed to improve their situation. Stewart 
asserted that
70 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” 
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lists of refugees have been padded. The United Nations pays out some $2.50 a month 
per capita to feed these unfortunate people, but the lists are padded. I am told it was 
reported last year that out of 900,000 refugees, only 400 died. The comparable death 
rate in this country, which is infinitely better off than the refugee camps, would be 
8,000. I should like to know where that money is going.... We speak a good deal 
about assuming the obligations which are ours under the United Nations charter. 
One of our obligations is to do everything in our power to see that war does not 
break out. Therefore I believe that Canada can do much more than it has done.73
In his own address before the House of Commons, Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Lester Pearson indicated that a “fair and honourable solution” had to be 
found for the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Pearson went on to note that shelter 
and an allowance were “pitiful substitutes for a permanent home and opportunities 
for gainful work.”74
 Amid this tense political climate, Paul Fortin, Officer-in-Charge in Athens, 
arrived in Beirut with Dr. Y. Dupuis as Medical Officer and Roger Shorey as 
Stage B Officer on January 13, 1956. Three days later, the Canadian immigration 
team commenced examining Palestinian refugees.75 Shortly thereafter, UNRWA 
informed the Canadian representatives that no pre-screening had taken place. 
With a rise in hostility to the Canadian plan across the Arab world, UNRWA 
officials declared that their position was “politically too delicate for them to 
undertake the responsibility of refusing to accept applications.” In reality, 
UNRWA was in no position to process any applications for pre-screening due 
to Arab hostility towards the resettlement of Palestinians abroad.76 Initially, 
188 cases representing 575 persons were selected by UNRWA in Beirut, Amman, 
and Jerusalem. By far the largest portion of applications came from Beirut (103 
representing 332 individuals), followed by Jerusalem (43 cases representing 127 
individuals), and Amman (42 cases representing 116 individuals).77 Cases were 
divided according to those “pending” (based on issues with travel documentation 
and Stage B clearance), those “rejected,” those “found not acceptable after pre-
interview,” and “applications withdrawn.”78 The Canadian immigration team 
73 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, House of Commons Debates: Official Report, Third Session 
– Twenty-Second Parliament, Volume 1 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1956), 
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74 Ibid., p. 468.
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accepted 53 cases comprising 98 individuals pending further approval.79 In 
Beirut, 36 applications were “tentatively accepted” representing 64 individuals. In 
Amman, 12 applications representing 24 individuals and in Jerusalem five cases 
representing 10 individuals were also approved.80
 The Canadian immigration team left the Middle East on February 1, 1956, 
having tentatively authorized visas for 53 applicants and their dependents out of 
approximately 100 applications the Canadian government was prepared to receive. 
In total, 40 out of the 53 successful applicants were single. This figure disappointed 
UNRWA, which attempted to resettle as many refugees as possible under Canada’s 
scheme. It should be noted that approximately 72 per cent of all applications were 
rejected because the head of household was over 45 years of age, the limit set by the 
federal Cabinet, or because of the ill health of one individual, which automatically 
disqualified an entire family. Successful applicants were also informed that, once 
in Canada, they would only be permitted to sponsor their children under the age of 
18 and any parent too old to work (fathers over 65 years of age and mothers over 
60 years of age). Other close relatives including brothers, sisters, or cousins could 
not be sponsored, even after each refugee became a Canadian citizen, for a period 
of five years.81 The Canadian immigration team physician, Dr. Y. Dupuis, remained 
“nevertheless impressed by the general good health, cleanliness and decency of 
the refugees he examined.” Among the 13 family units of two or more individuals 
tentatively admitted to Canada pending a successful Stage B examination, Ottawa 
was slated to receive a house-painter, who would arrive in his new country with 
his wife and seven children. The 40 single refugees were predominantly welders, 
diesel and automotive mechanics, house-painters, and typists. Initially, Canadian 
officials were hopeful that engineers, nurses, tailors, masons, and housekeeping 
service workers would be among the group of Palestinian refugees destined for 
Canada.82 Within the first group tentatively accepted to resettle in Canada were 
Christian and Muslim Arabs, as well as uprooted Armenians.
 In his report to his superiors in Ottawa, Officer-in-Charge Paul Fortin indicated 
that many applicants were rejected when they attempted to bring their entire 
families, including distant relatives who did not qualify under the trade criterion. 
Fortin asserted that “in a few cases, this has caused some ill feelings and, some 
time, harsh words, as these people had built a lot of hope on the scheme.”83 The 
Officer-in-Charge continued his assessment by suggesting that many prospective 
Palestinian applicants arrived at pre-screening with the idea that Canadian 
authorities would provide them with furnished homes, employment, and other 
necessities. Only 17 of the pending applicants were able to pay for their passage 
79 Ibid.
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to Canada. In some cases, UNRWA would pay for the transportation of persons 
who received rations or were employed by the organization.84 Among the pending 
cases were educated individuals who had experience in administrative and clerical 
sectors. Fortin argued that, since their experience was not in the trades, they 
“would hardly be suitable for establishment in Canada.” The Officer-in-Charge 
went even further when discussing those individuals with trade expertise by 
stating that, “except for a few exceptions, the great majority have a much lower 
level of education and they are far from being fluent in either language.”85
 On February 6, 1956, Canada’s Chargé d’affaires in Beirut sent a confidential 
despatch to Ottawa informing the Secretary of State for External Affairs that the 
project to resettle Palestinian refugees in Canada “aroused much less political 
opposition than we had expected.” Canadian officials in Beirut had initially been 
cautioned against the resettlement scheme by Dr. Fouad Ammoun, Secretary 
General of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, on November 30, 1955. In her despatch 
to Ottawa, MacCallum noted that not a single letter of protest had been received by 
the Legation or the immigration team during the resettlement project. As mentioned 
earlier, the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, voiced his 
opposition to the resettlement of Palestinians overseas. In reality, MacCallum 
observed that al-Husseini “waited until the members of the [immigration] team 
had finished their work before he called upon refugees to be aware of ‘this pro-
Zionist group,’ adjuring them when it was too late to refuse all settlement plans 
and remain in their demands to recover their property, their homes, and their 
lands.”86 Consequently, no protests came from the Arab League. In Damascus, 
UNRWA noted that opposition in Syria was provoked by the Syrian representative 
of the organization’s Advisory Council. When confronted by UNRWA’s French 
representative, who demanded to know why he opposed the best interests of the 
refugees, the Syrian representative backed down.87 MacCallum suggested to DEA 
officials in Ottawa,
In fact, it has been our general observation here that the Arab governments and 
refugee organizations, though firm enough on the principle of repatriation itself, 
are far from being vindictive toward individual refugees who have placed their 
own personal security above the general interest in repatriation of the displaced 
Arab population as a whole, although the danger of violence is never completely 
absent. In this the Arabs seem to be more lenient than were Jewish Committee 
agents toward those DP’s in European camps who accepted offers of resettlement in 
North America and were made to suffer for having broken the solid front organized 
for political purposes instead of demanding transfer to Palestine as the only form of 
resettlement they would accept. Fear does exist, however, among Palestinian Arab 
refugees in the camps, just as it existed among Jewish DP’s who felt themselves to be 
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, vol. 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General File,” despatch 
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continually under the scrutiny of camp organizers who insisted that everyone should 
tell visitors they would refuse to go anywhere if they could not go to Palestine.88
As Arab governments tempered their opposition to the resettlement of Palestinian 
refugees, two Arab refugee organizations complained of the proposal to their 
political representatives in the Middle East. MacCallum noted that the Sons of 
Palestine and Every Citizen a Sentry considered Western resettlement schemes 
to be a part of a concerted effort to siphon off the Palestinian refugee population 
from the region and to “settle the Palestinian dispute on Israel’s terms.” Many 
Arabs across the Middle East worried that Palestine would be lost forever to the 
state of Israel. Even as local opposition remained strong, Lebanese and Jordanian 
officials quietly recognized Canadian efforts to resettle displaced Palestinians.89 
In Ottawa, DEA officials discussed Canada’s policy towards the Middle East and 
concluded that it was in the national interest:
[T]he world today makes it impossible to disassociate ourselves effectively from 
the problems of any area.... We also have a certain moral involvement because 
Canada played a leading role in solving the Palestine problem and helping the 
United Nations to set up the State of Israel. We cannot now wash our hands of 
the problem. Nor, for internal political reasons, could we permit the destruction of 
Israel, even if we did not believe objectively in our moral obligation towards Israel. 
This moral obligation does not mean blind support of Israel against the Arabs. It 
simply means that we ought to help, either inside or outside the United Nations, 
to reach a solution of a problem which we, together with the other United Nations 
members, recognized as an international responsibility in 1947.90
In the eight weeks after the Canadian immigration team departed the Middle East 
and final authorization was given for visas, a significant number of individuals 
decided not to travel to Canada. As a result, only 39 heads of families and 37 
dependents received their visas, while two individuals were rejected due to Stage 
B considerations. The remaining persons tentatively accepted for admission to 
Canada failed to submit the necessary travel documentation for transmission 
to Canada’s visa officer in Athens. The first group of 10 heads of families and 
their dependents to leave for Canada were met by the Legation’s Vice Consul 
Michael Shenstone who delivered a short speech. Shenstone wished the refugees 
luck and informed them that their future in Canada would depend on their own 
efforts. Chargé d’affaires MacCallum noted in her correspondence with Ottawa 
that Shenstone’s words were well received by the refugees, who “seemed to be 
hard-working respectable people who will give no trouble.”91 The first group of 
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Palestinian refugees left Beirut aboard S.S. Adana for Naples, Italy, on April 6, 
1956 (see Table 1). Eight days later, the group boarded S.S. Saturnia and were 
scheduled to arrive in Halifax on April 24.92 The Palestinian refugees were given 
prepaid railway tickets for their journey from Halifax to Montreal, as well as cash 
for them to travel to their final destinations. The Immigration Branch informed its 
District Superintendents that the 26 Palestinian newcomers should be “extended 
every courtesy and consideration in order that their first impressions of Canada 
may be favourable.”93 A further nine refugees were destined for Canada in the 
summer of 1956; however, ship accommodations were not secured, and their 
arrival was delayed until August 5. Once the refugees were permanently settled 
in Canada, Immigration Branch officials remained in contact with each family for 
one year to assess their “aptitudes and adaptability.”94
Table 1 : First Group of Ten Heads of Household and Their Dependents
Head of Household Number of Persons in Family Destination
Bashir, Mahmud 8 Montreal, Quebec
Daou, Youssif 6 Montreal, Quebec
Rahal, Joseph 1 Windsor, Ontario
Bahlawan, Walid 1 Port Arthur, Ontario
Ayoub, Iskandar 1 Montreal, Quebec
Haikal, Zaki 1 Port Arthur, Ontario
Wahhab, Georges 1 Toronto, Ontario
Farkouh, Nicolas 1 Montreal, Quebec
Matta, Georges 1 Toronto, Ontario
Barbarian, Nazar 5 Toronto, Ontario
 
Source: LAC, IB fonds, RG 76, volume 865, file 555-54-607, part 1, “Refugees in Palestine – General 
File,” memorandum from Acting Chief, Operations Division, Immigration Branch, Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration, Ottawa, to District Superintendents, April 23, 1956.
 In the House of Commons, Leader of the Official Opposition John Diefenbaker 
questioned whether the Canadian government had made any advances towards 
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improving the Palestinian refugee situation in the Middle East. Diefenbaker 
claimed that, “as one visits these camps, one cannot but be impressed by the need 
for their existence while at the same time realizing that they constitute festering 
sores among the individuals occupying them.” Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Lester Pearson replied that Canada continued to contribute to UNRWA for 
the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, but concluded that resettlement in other 
parts of the Middle East or elsewhere was discouraged by Arab governments, and 
the refugees themselves were reluctant to leave the camps.95
 Canadian Legation officials in Beirut continued to view the Palestinian refugee 
resettlement scheme as a successful experiment. Larger events in the Middle East 
precluded any further attempts to bring Palestinian refugees to Canada. On July 
26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal 
after Britain and the United States decided to withdraw their offer to fund the 
construction of the Aswan Dam in retaliation for Cairo’s increasing ties with 
Moscow. On October 29, 1956, British, French, and Israeli forces attacked Egypt. 
Several days later on November 6, the British government announced a ceasefire. 
Coupled with these events, in Europe in early November Soviet forces invaded 
Hungary to crush a revolution against the Communist regime. Approximately 
200,000 refugees fled their homeland. With the assistance of Canadian immigration 
officials, 37,500 Hungarian refugees were resettled in Canada. In 1957, Canada 
received 282,164 immigrants, representing 1.7 per cent of Canada’s population. As 
a result, Canada witnessed the largest annual flow of immigrants since 1913.96 The 
same year, the economy declined into a recession, and the long-serving Liberal 
government was replaced by John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives.
 In his maiden speech before the UNGA, Minister of External Affairs 
Howard Green informed delegates that Canada “made substantial financial 
contributions” to UNRWA, to the UNHCR, and to the Far Eastern operation of 
the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. Green stated that 
“Canada can be counted on again this year to assume its share in maintaining these 
international programs.”97 During the UN International Year of the Refugee in 
1960, the Canadian government announced that it would contribute a further $1.5 
million for Palestinian refugees in addition to Ottawa’s annual commitment of 
$500,000.98 Although several members of the federal Cabinet felt that Canada had 
95 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, House of Commons Debates: Official Report, Third Session 
– Twenty-Second Parliament, Volume 7 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1956), 
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adequately supported the International Year of the Refugee, Green announced on 
June 30 that Canada would also send $1.5 million worth of flour to UNRWA. As 
Ottawa continued to promote a foreign policy for the Middle East that remained 
impartial, critics of Canada’s contributions towards the Palestinian refugees argued 
that its approach towards the refugee crisis was far from balanced. Zachariah Kay 
notes that, since Canadian funds were destined for Palestinian Arab refugees, an 
equivalent amount should have been allocated for Jewish refugees displaced by 
the events of 1948. Kay asks how Canada could remain impartial if it had an 
“overabundant response” to the plight of Palestinian Arab refugees and did not 
recognize all the refugees in the region.99
Conclusion
In the 1950s, the Canadian government’s preferred form of refugee acceptance 
was permanent resettlement. Through federal Cabinet directives, Canadian 
diplomats and immigration officials abroad were given regional and situational 
quotas for their respective resettlement schemes. In the case of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, the Canadian government was sensitive to 
the volatile political environment and the need for a humanitarian response to the 
plight of refugees in the Middle East.100 Canadian involvement in the Middle East 
was predicated on two principles. Federal officials believed that any resolution of 
the refugee crisis required a multilateral effort sanctioned by the United Nations. 
Similarly, Canadian officials determined that a resolution of the displacement of 
Arab and Jewish Palestinian refugees would have to precede any comprehensive 
political and military settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbours.101 The 
Canadian government used practical means, including the introduction of a 
resettlement scheme for Palestinian refugees, in an attempt to help alleviate the 
refugee crisis in the Middle East.
 Arab governments across the Middle East privately acquiesced to Canada’s 
resettlement scheme, while some of their officials voiced opposition to such a plan. 
Publicly, Arab leaders were concerned that any Western offer to find a permanent 
solution to the plight of nearly a million displaced Palestinian refugees could be 
misinterpreted as accepting the status quo. As a result, any scheme to resettle 
refugees elsewhere had to be publicly repudiated. This duplicitous attitude on the 
part of the Lebanese, Syrian, and Jordanian governments almost led to the collapse 
of the Canadian government’s plan to resettle approximately 100 breadwinners and 
their close relatives. Even as interest among Palestinian refugees for permanent 
resettlement increased, UNRWA attempted to remain impartial before Arab 
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officials across the Middle East. As a result, the organization’s publicity of the 
Canadian offer was poor, and the pool of qualified candidates was smaller than the 
Canadian immigration team had initially sought upon arrival in Beirut, Amman, 
and Jerusalem.102
 Given the short period to select, admit, and resettle successful Palestinian 
applicants, the Canadian immigration team lacked the necessary time to promote 
the resettlement scheme properly. In their own assessment of the plan to resettle 
Palestinian refugees, former immigration officer Michael Molloy and researcher 
Robin Fraser note that it was largely unexplainable why Canadian officials wasted 
an entire month attempting to communicate the necessary medical screening 
requirements, when the process had remained the same for years. Another issue 
that the Canadian immigration team faced was a lack of proper communication 
between immigration officials in Ottawa and the Legation in Beirut. Initially, 
Canadian diplomats and immigration officials in Beirut were not made aware of 
the 45-year age limit for prospective heads of households. Similarly, Canadian 
officials failed to inform UNRWA that any male heads of household over 45 years 
of age would be screened out. This severely hampered the agency’s efforts to pre-
screen prospective applicants. Molloy and Fraser note that, since Ottawa failed 
to copy the Canadian Legation in Beirut in its correspondence to immigration 
officials in Athens, immigration officials in Lebanon were unable to accommodate 
large multi-generational family structures even though they had been “flagged by 
the Legation.”103 Canadian officials in Beirut noted that many prospective heads-
of-households applied to resettle in Canada as members of multi-generational 
families. Due to the socio-cultural context of the time, officials in Ottawa could 
not conceive of large families with a middle-aged breadwinner and working-
age children. These families were not considered “normal” and were effectively 
screened out. This miscommunication cost the Canadian scheme a much larger 
pool of potential candidates.104
 Archival records pertaining to the federal government’s resettlement of 53 
successful applicants and their 45 dependents in 1956 illustrate that Canadian 
immigration policy and practice had remained largely unchanged since the end 
of the Second World War. As officials in Ottawa provided political guidance 
in the form of quotas, definitions, and selection criteria, Canadian diplomats 
and immigration officers were left in the field to handle local appeals from 
representatives of international organizations. Similarly, Canadian officials in the 
field examined, pre-selected, and screened potential applicants based on the age of 
heads-of-household and their occupations, the composition of their families, any 
health issues, and whether they or any family member constituted a security risk. 
Once the 98 Palestinian refugees were pre-selected in early 1956, immigration 
officials began to plan their travel to Canada, where they were to be resettled 
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in Windsor, London, Hamilton, Toronto, Ottawa, and Port Arthur in Ontario 
and Hull, Montreal, Quebec, and Trois-Rivières in the province of Quebec.105 
However, a significant number of individuals decided not to travel to Canada. 
Only 39 heads of families and 37 dependents received their visas, while two 
individuals were rejected due to Stage B considerations. The remaining persons 
tentatively accepted for admission to Canada failed to submit the necessary travel 
documentation to Canada’s visa officer in Athens.
 During the 1950s, Canadian immigration policy and practice still reflected the 
values put forward by Prime Minister Mackenzie King in the House of Commons 
in 1947 – that Canada had a “moral obligation” to assist the world’s refugees. 
However, Mackenzie King stated that “the people of Canada do not wish as a 
result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character 
of our population.”106 In essence, Canada was to remain a predominantly white, 
Christian, and democratic society. Less than five years after the 1952 Immigration 
Act restricted non-European immigration to Canada, the resettlement of Palestinian 
refugees in 1956 remains one of the earliest postwar schemes to resettle non-
European refugees in Canada. It is an often-overlooked, if not forgotten chapter 
in Canadian immigration history. Since Canada was the fourth largest financial 
contributor to UNRWA in the mid-1950s, officials in Ottawa desired to alleviate 
the refugee crisis in the Middle East. Although Canadian officials believed it was 
good foreign policy to resettle refugees from the Middle East – an effort that 
would also help to ease the region’s political instability – their attempts remained 
largely hollow with the admission of only 98 individuals from nearly one million 
Palestinian refugees. This figure alone suggests that Canadian officials were not 
entirely comfortable with permitting a large influx of skilled refugees from the 
Middle East.107
 The federal government’s scheme to resettle Palestinian refugees proved to be 
an important precedent in Canadian immigration policy and practice. Less than a 
year later, Canadian immigration officials successfully resettled tens of thousands 
of Britons and other Europeans who were spurred to emigrate during the Suez 
Crisis. In the fall of 1956, over 200,000 Hungarian refugees were forced to flee 
the Soviet invasion of their homeland. In November 1956, Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration Jack Pickersgill flew to Vienna and made a number of important 
decisions on the ground to facilitate the resettlement of 37,500 Hungarian refugees 
to Canada. Two decades later, the introduction of a humanitarian class in the 
1976 Immigration Act solidified Canada’s obligations under the UN Convention 
relating to refugees and the 1967 Protocol to protect foreign nationals who feared 
persecution if repatriated back to their country of origin. The humanitarian 
class included refugees who fit the UN Convention definition and individuals 
who were considered persecuted and displaced persons, but did not qualify as 
refugees under the UN Convention. Prior to the 1976 Act, Canadian efforts to 
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resettle refugees and persecuted persons including the 1955 Palestinian scheme 
fell to ad hoc Cabinet decisions and orders-in-council.108 With the introduction of 
new immigration legislation in the 1970s, the Canadian government had learned 
from past resettlement schemes and entrenched its legal obligations to act on 
behalf of the world’s refugees. In 1989, the Canadian government established 
the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) to assess inland applicants and 
immigrants’ refugee status. In recent years, Palestinian refugees continue to seek 
asylum in Canada. Since they remain outside the UN Convention definition of a 
refugee, Palestinian refugees are forced to seek admission through the IRB on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds.109
 Ultimately, the 1955 Palestinian scheme was an important early experiment for 
the resettlement of non-European refugees to Canada. It would allow Canadian 
immigration officials to plan, prepare, and carry out future refugee resettlement 
efforts overseas. Eventually, it also led to a legal framework that formalized how 
refugees were admitted and resettled in Canada.
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